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Abstract
This paper studies a sale promotion mechanism design prob-
lem on a social network, where a node (a seller) sells one
item to the other nodes on the network to maximize her rev-
enue. However, the seller does not know other nodes except
for her neighbours and her neighbours have no incentive to
promote the sale. Hence, the goal is to design an auction
mechanism such that the seller’s neighbours are incentivized
to invite their neighbours to join the auction, while the seller’s
revenue is guaranteed to increase. This is not achievable with
traditional mechanisms. One solution has been proposed re-
cently by carefully designing a reward scheme for the nodes
who have invited others. However, the solution only gives re-
wards to some cut-points of the network, but cut-points rarely
exist in a well-connected network, which actually disincen-
tivizes nodes’ participation. Therefore, we propose another
novel mechanism to reward more related participants with
fairer rewards, and the seller’s revenue is even improved com-
pared to the previous solution.
Introduction
Marketing is a vital element in the development of the econ-
omy. Due to limited personal social connections, sellers of-
ten seek various kinds of ways to enlarge the market and
attract more potential buyers. Traditionally, they tend to sell
products via online shopping platforms such as Amazon and
eBay. However, the platforms cannot always maximize the
sellers’ revenue because it may cost a large amount of money
for using the platforms’ services such as advertisement.
Alternatively, a seller can hold an auction among her
neighbours using the classic auction protocol Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) (Clarke 1971; Vickrey 1961; Groves
1973) with an optimal reserve price (Myerson 1981), which
optimizes the seller’s revenue locally. To further increase the
seller’s revenue, diffusion mechanisms on social networks
have been proposed to attract more buyers. Li et al. (2017)
proposed the first such auction on social networks, called in-
formation diffusion mechanism (IDM). IDM can incentivize
the seller’s neighbours to propagate the auction information
to their neighbours, and these newly informed neighbours
will do the same. Eventually, all potential buyers on the net-
work are informed, which improves the seller’s revenue. To
achieve this goal, IDM distributes dedicated rewards to the
cut-points from the seller to the winner who receives the
item. However, according to the theorem of small-world net-
works (Amaral et al. 2000), the chance for a node to be a cut-
point in a well-connected social network is very low. Hence,
only a very small proportion of the buyers on the network
can benefit from the mechanism, which disincentivizes buy-
ers’ participation.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose another novel dif-
fusion mechanism, which distributes the rewards to all the
related buyers not only the cut-points on the paths to the
winner. In addition to the cut-points, we also pay a group of
buyers who are not cut-points alone but can disconnect the
winner from the seller together with other non-cut-points.
They are less important compared to the cut-points, but still
critical. Under this mechanism, we can still ensure that buy-
ers will report their truthful valuation for the item and invite
all their neighbours without a predefined reward. More im-
portantly, we tackled the challenge without sacrificing the
seller’s revenue, i.e., the seller’s revenue in our mechanism
is at least as good as that in the previous work.
There exists some closely related work on social net-
works (Easley and Kleinberg 2010; Scott 1988). For in-
stance, Li et al. (2019) gave a class of mechanisms simi-
lar to IDM and proved that IDM gives the lowest revenue
in the class. However, they still focused on distributing re-
wards to the cut-points while the major goal of our mecha-
nism is to also give rewards to all the related buyers. Wang
and Chiu (2008) presented a recommendation system to cal-
culate the level of recommendation for online auctions. Pan-
dit et al. (2007) designed a system based on social networks
to avoid auction fraud. They mainly focused on the applica-
tions in the real-world without considering the mathemati-
cal properties of the mechanisms, while we look at the game
theoretical properties of the mechanism on networks.
In our mechanism, in order to pay the non-cut-points,
we have applied some techniques from the redistribution
mechanism design literature. Many redistribution mecha-
nisms have been proposed to redistribute the surplus back to
the buyers as reward (Cavallo 2006; Guo and Conitzer 2009;
Guo 2011). The objective of their redistribution mechanisms
is to satisfy the budget balance property, which is to give
back the payments to the participants as much as possi-
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ble. However, in our setting, we are aiming to improve the
seller’s revenue through getting more potential buyers. Thus,
we only borrow the idea of the redistribution to reward more
buyers in our mechanism while improving the seller’s rev-
enue (budget-balance would not give any revenue to the
seller).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First,
we describe the necessary preliminaries of the problem.
Next, we define some basic concepts and introduce our novel
mechanism in detail, and show the advantages of our mecha-
nism compared to the previous work. Then we show the key
properties of our mechanism. Finally, we conclude our work
and discuss future work.
Preliminaries
We consider a market where seller s sells an item in a social
network. The network is modelled as an undirected graph
G = (V,E), where V = N ∪ {s} = {1, 2, . . . , n} ∪ {s}
denotes the set of all nodes of the network andE denotes the
set of all the edges. Each i ∈ N represents a potential buyer
of the item, and she has a set of neighbours ri ⊆ V . Node
j ∈ ri if there is an edge eij ∈ E connecting buyer i and
buyer j. Each buyer i ∈ V has a depth di > 0 representing
the length of the shortest path from the seller to i. Each buyer
i ∈ V has a private valuation vi ≥ 0 for receiving the item.
We assume that the seller’s valuation for the item is zero.
Figure 1 shows an example on the social network, where the
letter beside each node is the label of a buyer and the value
in each node is the buyer’s private valuation for receiving the
item.
Traditionally, since the seller s has no prior knowledge
about the network, she can only sell the item among her
neighbours rs without doing any advertising. In order to gain
more revenue, the seller has to invite more potential buyers
with higher valuations to join the sale. This can be achieved
by asking her neighbours to invite their neighbours to join
the sale. However, they would not invite their neighbours to
compete with them without any incentive. Hence, we build
incentives to tackle this challenge in this paper.
In this paper, we propose a novel diffusion mechanism,
which aims to reward all the related buyers who also make
a contribution for inviting the winner but not only the cut-
points as the previous work did. Also, all the buyers are in-
centivized to not only report their private valuations for the
item to the mechanism but also propagate the sale informa-
tion to all their neighbours voluntarily without prepaid re-
wards. Our mechanism will not reduce the seller’s revenue
compared to the previous work.
For each buyer i ∈ N , let θi = (vi, ri) be i’s type and the
type profile of all the buyers is denoted as θ = (θ1, . . . , θn).
Let θ−i be the type profile for buyers except i, and we can
also represent the type profile as θ = (θ−i, θi). Let Θi be the
type space for buyer i and Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,Θn) = (Θ−i,Θi)
be the type profile space for all buyers.
In the mechanism, each buyer i ∈ N is required to report
her type. Let ai = (v′i, r
′
i) be the i’s reported type where
v′i represents the valuation she reported and r
′
i represents
the neighbours she has invited. If she is not involved in the
mechanism, let ai = nil.
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Figure 1: A social network example
Definition 1. We say an action profile a is feasible if for
each buyer i ∈ N with ai 6= nil, there must exist at least one
path Psi = (s, k1, . . . , km, i) from s to i, where k1 ∈ rs, i ∈
r′km and kt+1 ∈ r′kt for 1 ≤ t < m. In other words, without
invitation, the buyers cannot join to the sale. Let F(θ) ⊆ Θ
be the set of all feasible action profiles.
Definition 2. A diffusion mechanismM on the social net-
work is defined by an allocation policy pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pin)
and a payment policy p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn), where pii : Θ→
{0, 1} and pi : Θ→ R.
Given an action profile a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ F(θ), the
payment policy p(a) = (p1(a), . . . , pn(a)) represents the
money each buyer is asked to pay. For buyer i ∈ N , if
pi(a) ≥ 0, then she needs to pay pi to the seller, and if
pi(a) < 0, she will receive |pi(a)| from the seller. The al-
location policy pi(a) = (pi1(a), . . . , pin(a)) represents the
item allocation result, and we have
pii(a) =
{
1 if buyer i receives the item
0 if buyer i does not receive the item
Since there is only one item to sell, we say the allocation pi
is feasible if no more than one buyer with ai 6= nil receives
the item under all feasible action profiles. We will only con-
sider feasible allocation policies in the following discussion.
Definition 3. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ) and
a feasible allocation pi, the social welfare of allocation pi(a)
is
∑
i∈N pii(a)v
′
i.
Under the diffusion mechanismM = (pi, p), we assume
that there is no cost for a buyer to spread the sale information
to her neighbours. Thus, for buyer i ∈ N of type profile θi,
given a feasible action profile a of all buyers, i’s utility is
defined as
ui(θi, a) = pii(a)vi − pi(a)
We say a diffusion mechanism is individually rational if the
utility of each buyer involved is non-negative as long as she
reports the valuation truthfully no matter how many neigh-
bours she invites.
Definition 4. A diffusion mechanism M = (pi, p) is indi-
vidual rational (IR) if ui(θi, a) ≥ 0, where ai = (vi, r′i) for
all i ∈ N , all θ ∈ Θ and all a ∈ F(θ).
Traditionally, if all the buyers are willing to report their
truthful valuations for the item, we say the mechanism sat-
isfies the property of incentive compatibility or truthfulness.
However, in our mechanism, buyers also need to invite the
neighbours. Thus, we want to incentivize buyers not only
to report their truthful valuations but also to invite all their
neighbours. Therefore, we define incentive compatibility as
follows.
Definition 5. A diffusion mechanism M = (pi, p) is in-
centive compatible (IC) if ui(θi, a) ≥ ui(θi, a′), for all
i ∈ N , all θ ∈ Θ and all a, a′ ∈ F(θ) such that ai = θi
and a′ = f(a, a′i), where f is a mapping function that if i
changes her action to a′i, other buyers remains their action
except that the action of those who cannot be connected to s
should be nil.
In the following section, we will introduce a novel diffu-
sion mechanism rewarding all the related buyers who also
make a contribution for inviting the winner, which satisfies
the properties of IR and IC. We further prove that the rev-
enue of the seller under our mechanism is higher than that of
the traditional VCG in which the seller sells the item among
her neighbours, and also higher than that of the previous
work.
Fair Diffusion Mechanism
In this section, we will introduce our advanced mechanism
called the fair diffusion mechanism (FDM). This mechanism
aims to distribute rewards to all the related buyers (not only
the cut-points) with IR and IC guaranteed, which is achieved
without sacrificing the sellers revenue (even better than the
previous work (Li et al. 2017)).
Before we introduce our mechanism, we need some addi-
tional definitions.
Definition 6. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), for
each buyer i ∈ N , if there exists no path from the seller to
i without the participation of a set Di ⊆ N , we say Di is
a cut set of buyer i. If there is no proper subset D′i ⊂ Di
which is also a cut set of i, we say Di is a minimal cut set
of buyer i.
The cut sets of a buyer are the buyers who can separate
the buyer from the seller and all the minimal cut sets can
be induced from the cut sets. For example, in Figure 2(a),
{b, g},{d, f, g, h} and {l, k} are three cut sets of buyer l,
while {b}, {f, g, h} and {l} are three minimal cut sets of l.
Definition 7. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), for
each buyer i, j ∈ N , we say j is a critical ancestor of i if j
belongs to a minimal cut set of buyer i.
Definition 8. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), for
each buyer i, j ∈ N , we say j is a strong critical ancestor of
i if j alone forms a minimal cut set of i. We say j is a weak
critical ancestor of i if j is a critical ancestor, but not strong
critical ancestor of i.
Intuitively, for each buyer i ∈ N , her critical ancestors
are those who are on some simple path from the seller to i.
Strong critical ancestors are the cut points from the seller to
i, while weak critical ancestors are those who connect strong
critical ancestors. All these critical ancestors have a contri-
bution to connect the seller and buyer i. In Figure 2(a), all the
colored nodes are the critical ancestors of buyer m, where
nodes in orange are strong critical ancestors and nodes in
yellow are weak critical ancestors.
Definition 9. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ),
for each buyer i, j ∈ N , we say j is i’s critical de-
scendant if i is a strong critical ancestor of j. Let Vi =
{j| j is i’s critical descendant, j ∈ N} be the critical de-
scendant set of buyer i. Similarly, for any set K ⊆ N , we
say j is K’s critical descendant if K is a cut set of j. Let
VK = {j| j is K’s critical descendant, j ∈ N} be the criti-
cal descendant set of the set K.
We can easily observe that on a social network, if a buyer
i quits the mechanism, her critical descendant set will not
be involved in the auction. Here, we use the notation N−i
to represent the vertex set in the new network without the
participation of i, which is equivalent to N \ Vi. Similarly,
N−K = N \
⋃
i∈K Vi. Take Figure 2(b) as an example,
as all the red nodes cannot be involved in the mechanism
without the participation of buyer b, they are critical de-
scendant set of b. Thus, Vb = {b, e, f, g, h, j, k, l,m, n} and
N−b = {a, c, d, i}.
Definition 10. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ),
for each buyer i ∈ N , let Ci be the strong critical an-
cestor sequence of i, denoted by Ci = {ci1, ci2, · · · , cik},
where cik = i. Each c
i
j ∈ Ci is a strong critical ancestor of
buyer i and the order is determined by the relation of depth
dci1 < dci2 < · · · < dcik .
To simplify the description, let C = {c1, c2, · · · , ch} be
the strong critical ancestor sequence of the highest bidder h
among all the buyers on the network.
Definition 11. Given a feasible action profile a ∈
F(θ), for each ci, ci+1 ∈ C, let Mcici+1 be the
weak critical ancestor set between ci and ci+1, denoted
by Mcici+1 = {m1cici+1 ,m2cici+1 , · · · ,mkcici+1}, where
vm1cici+1
≥ vm2cici+1 ≥ · · · ≥ vmkcici+1 . Each m
j
cici+1 ∈
Mcici+1 is a weak critical ancestor of buyer i, who is on
some simple path from ci to ci+1.
As shown in Figure 2(a), buyer m is the highest bidder
with reported valuation v′m = 14. Therefore, the strong crit-
ical ancestor sequence of m is C = {b, l,m} and the weak
critical ancestor sets areMbl = {h, k, g, j, f} andMlm = ∅.
Li et al. (2017) proposed a diffusion mechanism IDM on
the social network. Their mechanism does satisfy the IC
property we have defined. However, it only distributes re-
wards to the winner’s strong critical ancestors on the net-
work and ignores the contribution of the winner’s weak crit-
ical ancestors. Therefore, only a few specific nodes may re-
ceive a non-zero utility for diffusing the information.
In contrast, the diffusion rewards in our mechanism are
distributed more fairly. Especially, not only strong critical
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Figure 2: (a) The orange nodes represents the strong critical
ancestors of buyer m, while the yellow nodes represents the
weak critical ancestors of buyerm on the social network; (b)
The red nodes represents the critical descendant set of buyer
b.
ancestors are rewarded, but also weak critical ancestors who
are not cut-points but do diffuse the sale mechanism to the
winner are rewarded. Moreover, the seller’s revenue under
our mechanism is at least as good as that in IDM.
Now, we are ready to describe our fair diffusion mecha-
nism.
Fair Diffusion Mechanism (FDM)
1. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), find the
highest bidder h ∈ arg maxi∈N v′i (with random tie-
breaking). Let v1
st
D = maxi∈D v
′
i be the maximum
reported valuation in the subset D ⊆ N , and then
v′h = v
1st
N . Let g
1st
D ∈ arg maxi∈D v1
st
Vi
(with ran-
dom tie-breaking) be the strong critical ancestor in
the subset D ⊆ N of the highest bidder in VD.
2. Then, the allocation policy can be recursively defined
as:
• Allocation Policy:
pii(a) =

1 if i = cj ∈ C, v′i = v1
st
N−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1
and
∑
k∈N−i pik(a) = 0
0 otherwise
3. According to the allocation policy, we can get a win-
ner cw ∈ C with picw(a) = 1. Then we distribute
rewards to the buyers on the strong critical ancestor
sequence Cˆ = {c1, c2, · · · , cw} and the weak critical
ancestors
⋃w−1
j=1 Mcjcj+1 .
4. We have the payment policy defined as:
• Payment Policy: pi =
v1
st
N−cj
−v1stN−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1 −Rcj if i=cj ∈ Cˆ\cw
v1
st
N−cw
−Rcw if i = cw
−Ri if i ∈Mcj−1cj
0 otherwise
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Figure 3: (a) Find the strong critical ancestors and calculate
the money they pay and receive; (b) Redistribute the differ-
ence as reward.
where Ri is defined as: Ri =
v1
st
N
−cj∪g1
st
Mcj−1cj
−v1stN−cj∪Mcj−1cj
|Mcj−1cj |+1 if i = cj ∈ Cˆ
v1
st
N−i∪cj
−v1stN−cj∪Mcj−1cj
|Mcj−1cj |+1 if i ∈Mcj−1cj
0 otherwise
The intuition behind the FDM is that the mechanism al-
locates the item to the first buyer cj in the strong critical
ancestor sequence of the highest bidder whose reported val-
uation is the highest among all the buyers if cj+1 ∪Mcjcj+1
are not involved in the auction, where cj+1 is the next strong
critical ancestor andMcjcj+1 is the weak critical ancestor set
between cj and cj+1.
For each strong critical ancestor cj ∈ Cˆ, her pay-
ment consists of three parts: the money she paid v1
st
N−cj
to the last strong critical ancestor, the money she received
v1
st
N−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1
from the next strong critical ancestor and
the reward redistributed to her Rcj . The money paid is the
highest reported valuation without her participation and the
money received is the highest reported valuation without the
participation of cj+1 ∪ Mcjcj+1 . Specially, for the winner,
the money received from the next critical ancestor is zero.
Since the money paid and the money received between two
strong critical ancestors cj and cj+1 are not always equal,
the mechanism redistributes the difference to the weak crit-
ical ancestors Mcjcj+1 and the strong critical ancestor cj+1.
Inspired by the VCG redistribution mechanism (Cavallo
2006), the redistributed reward of buyer i ∈Mcjcj+1 ∪ cj+1
is calculated by the lower-bound of the new difference over
all possible reported type of i divided by the number of the
buyers sharing the reward, which is |Mcjcj+1 |+1. More con-
cretely, for cj ∈ Cˆ, the new lower-bound of the difference
is v1
st
N−cj∪g1
st
Mcj−1cj
− v1stN−cj∪Mcj−1cj , where v
1st
N−cj∪g1
st
Mcj−1cj
is the payment of the new strong critical ancestor among
Mcj−1cj without cj’s participation and v
1st
N−cj∪Mcj−1cj
is the
money received of cj−1. For i ∈ Mcj−1cj , the new lower-
bound of the difference is v1
st
N−i∪cj
− v1stN−cj∪Mcj−1cj , where
v1
st
N−i∪cj
is the new payment of cj without the participation
of i and v1
st
N−cj∪Mcj−1cj
is also the money received of cj−1.
Based on the social network discussed before, here we
give a running example of FDM in Figure 3. Among all the
buyers on the network, buyerm reports the highest valuation
with v′m = 14. Then C = {b, l,m} is the strong critical an-
cestor sequence ofm. According to the allocation policy, the
item is given to buyer l because v′l = v
1st
N−m∪Mlm
. Thus, the
strong critical ancestor sequence of l is Cˆ = {b, l} and the
weak critical ancestor set is Mbl = {h, k, g, j, f}. We first
consider the strong critical ancestors. For buyer b, the money
she pays to the seller is v1
st
N−b = v
′
i = 7 and the money she
receives from buyer l is v1
st
N−l∪Mbl
= v′e = 8. Similarly, for
buyer l, the money she pays is v1
st
N−l = v
′
h = 11 and she
receives nothing since she is the winner. Therefore, the dif-
ference between the money paid by buyer l and the money
received by buyer b is ∆ = 11−8 = 3. Then we redistribute
the difference to Mbl and l, and the number of buyers shar-
ing the reward is 6. For buyer l, if she does not participate in
the mechanism, the winner will be h who will pay v′k = 10.
Then the difference becomes ∆′ = 10 − 8 = 2. So the re-
ward to l is Rl = 2/6 = 1/3. Similarly, for buyer h, the
difference will also become ∆′ = 10 − 8 = 2 without her
participation. Thus, we have Rh = 2/6 = 1/3. For buyer
f, g, j, k, the difference will not change if any of them is not
involved in the mechanism, so we have Rf = Rg = Rj =
Rk = 3/6 = 1/2. Till now, Mbl and l are redistributed
the rewards. The remaining money ∆ − ∑Mbl∪lRi =
3 − 2 ∗ 1/3 − 4 ∗ 1/2 = 1/3 will be given to the seller.
Then the payment for all the critical buyers is calculated as:
pb = 7− 8 = −1, pl = 11− 1/3 = 32/3, ph = −1/3 and
pf = pg = pj = pk = −1/2. According to the definition
of utility, we have ub = pib(a)vb − pb = 0 − (−1) = 1,
ul = 13 − 32/3 = 7/3, uh = 0 − (−1/3) = 1/3 and
uf = ug = uj = uk = 0 − 1/2 = 1/2. The revenue of
the seller is us = pb + pl + ph + pf + pg + pj + pk =
(−1) + 32/3 + (−1/3) + 4 ∗ (−1/2) = 22/3.
Comparison between FDM and IDM
To show the advantages of our mechanism over the previ-
ous related work, here we compare the running result for the
same example under IDM and analyze the performance of
FDM and IDM.
Compared to the IDM proposed by Li et al. (2017), they
only give rewards to those strong critical ancestors. As the
running example shown in Figure 4(b) for the same social
network, under IDM, buyer l is also the winner with pl = 11
and the utility of strong critical ancestor b is 4, but all the
other buyers on the network will have zero utilities. This is
because none of the other buyers is a cut-point to reach l
from s. In contrast, five more buyers f, g, h, j and k, who
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(b)
Figure 4: (a) A running example of FDM; (b) A running ex-
ample of IDM. (The first number in the vector is the money
paid, the second is the money received and the third is the
money redistributed.)
are also on some simple path from the seller to the win-
ner, gain positive utilities in the same setting under FDM
in Figure 4(a). Although they are not cut-points to reach l
from s, they can disconnect l from s together. Therefore,
FDM also considers their diffusion contribution from this as-
pect, which is fairer for all the related buyers in the network.
Moreover, the seller’s revenue under FDM is 22/3 which is
bigger than 7 in IDM.
FDM IDM
winner buyer l buyer l
social welfare 13 13
beneficial buyers b, f, g, h, j, k, l b, l
# of beneficial buyers 7 2
beneficial critical ancestor ratio 1 0.29
buyers’ total utility 5.67 6
seller’s revenue 7.33 7
Table 1: The performance difference of FDM and IDM.
Table 1 gives an intuitive display for the performance dif-
ference between FDM and IDM of the same running exam-
ple. We can obviously observe that although the winner and
the social welfare are the same for the two mechanisms, the
number of beneficial buyers in FDM is far greater than that
of IDM. Furthermore, the beneficial critical ancestor ratio,
i.e., the percentage of positive-utility buyers over all the crit-
ical ancestors, is 1 in FDM while 0.29 in IDM. This indicates
that all the critical ancestors of the winner in FDM but only
a tiny fraction in IDM will be rewarded, which shows the
fairness of our mechanism. On the other hand, in spite of the
decrease of the buyers’ total utility, the seller’s revenue un-
der FDM is much higher than IDM without sacrificing any
desirable properties, which encourages the seller more to ap-
ply our mechanism.
Properties of FDM
In this section, we will prove that FDM satisfies the prop-
erties of IR and IC, and the seller’s revenue is at least as
good as the revenue under IDM, which is no less than that
of traditional VCG among neighbours.
Firstly, we show that all the buyers in our mechanism will
not have negative utilities if they report their valuation truth-
fully.
Theorem 1. The fair diffusion mechanism is individually
rational.
Proof. After the execution of the FDM, only critical buy-
ers may have non-zero utilities. Since Ri is the redistributed
reward, it is obvious that Ri ≥ 0 according to the definition.
• For buyer i = cj ∈ Cˆ \ cw, her utility is ucj (a) =
picj (a)vcj − pcj = v1
st
N−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1
− v1stN−cj + Rcj .
Since buyer cj is ahead of Mcjcj+1 on any path from
seller to the winner, we have Vcj ⊃ Vcj+1∪Mcjcj+1 and
then N−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1 ⊃ N−cj . Thus, we have ucj (a) =
v1
st
N−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1
− v1stN−cj + Rcj ≥ v
1st
N−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1
−
v1
st
N−cj
≥ 0.
• For buyer i = cw, since she is the winner, we have
vcw = v
1st
N−cw+1∪Mcwcw+1
. Then her utility is ucw(a) =
picw(a)vcw−pcw = vcw−v1
st
N−cw
+Rcw ≥ vcw−v1
st
N−cw
=
v1
st
N−cw+1∪Mcwcw+1
− v1stN−cw ≥ 0.
• For buyer i ∈ Mcj−1cj , her utility is ui(a) = pii(a)vi −
pi = Ri ≥ 0.
The payments for all the other buyers are zero. Therefore,
the FDM is individually rational.
Theorem 2 proves that in FDM, all the buyers are incen-
tivized to report their truthful type to the seller, i.e., their
truthful valuations and all their neighbours.
Theorem 2. The fair diffusion mechanism is incentive com-
patible.
Proof. According to the definition of incentive compatibil-
ity, we have to prove that for all the buyers in the graph, re-
porting their truthful valuations for the item and propagating
the sale information to all their neighbours is the dominant
strategy. Note that we do not consider the collaboration be-
tween buyers. More concretely, each buyer i ∈ N can only
cut the edges to the neighbours who also belong to her criti-
cal descendant set, which is ri∩Vi, because those neighbours
can only receive the sale information from i. However, the
other neighbours can receive the information from the seller
through other paths to connect i, then buyer i cannot cut the
edges by herself.
The buyers on the network can be divided into four groups
in FDM:
(1) the non-winner strong critical ancestors cj ∈ Cˆ \ cw.
(2) the weak critical ancestors between strong critical an-
cestors.
(3) the winner cw who receives the item.
(4) all the other buyers who are not in group (1), (2) and (3).
• For any strong critical ancestor cj in Group (1):
– If the neighbour set r′cj reported is fixed,
the utility of buyer cj is defined by ucj =
v1
st
N
−cj∪g1
st
Mcj−1cj
−v1stN−cj∪Mcj−1cj
|Mcj−1cj |+1 + v
1st
N−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1
−
v1
st
N−cj
, which is not related to her reported valua-
tion v′cj . If the allocation is unchanged, no matter
what valuation she reports, her utility remains the
same. If she reports a higher valuation to be the
winner, the reward redistributed remains the same
and her utility becomes u′cj = vcj − v1
st
N−cj
+ Rcj <
v1
st
N−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1
− v1stN−cj +Rcj = ucj .
– If the valuation v′cj reported is fixed and r
′
cj 6= rcj .
∗ If she is still the strong critical ancestor, we have
N ′−cj+1∪M ′cjcj+1
⊆ N−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1 , and then
v1
st
N ′−cj+1∪M′cjcj+1
≤ v1stN−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1 . Since the
money paid v1
st
N−cj
and the reward redistributed Rcj
remains the same, removing neighbours may decrease
the money she received.
∗ If she becomes a weak critical ancestor with
positive utility, then her utility becomes
u′cj ≤
v1
st
N
−cj∪g1
st
Mcj−1cj
−v1stN−cj∪Mcj−1cj
|Mcj−1cj |+1 ≤ ucj ,
since v1
st
N−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1
− v1stN−cj ≥ 0.
∗ If she becomes the new winner, the reward redis-
tributed remains the same and her utility becomes
u′cj = vcj − v1
st
N−cj
+ Rcj < v
1st
N−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1
−
v1
st
N−cj
+Rcj = ucj .
∗ If she is neither a strong critical ancestor nor a weak
critical ancestor, her utility u′cj = 0.
• For any weak critical ancestor i ∈ Mcj−1cj in Group
(2):
– If the neighbour set r′i reported is fixed, the util-
ity of buyer i is defined by ui = Ri =
v1
st
N−i∪cj
−v1stN−cj∪Mcj−1cj
|Mcj−1cj |+1 , which is not related to her
reported valuation v′i. If the allocation is unchanged,
no matter what valuation she reports, her utility re-
mains the same. If she reports a higher valuation to
be the winner, the reward redistributed to her remains
the same and her utility becomes u′i = vi − v1
st
N−i +
v1
st
N−i∪cj
−v1stN−cj∪Mcj−1cj
|Mcj−1cj |+1 . Since vi < v
1st
N−i , we have
u′i < ui.
– If the valuation v′i reported is fixed and r′i 6= ri. The
utility of buyer i is ui = Ri, which is not related to i’s
critical descendants. Since there is no other strong crit-
ical ancestors in the weak critical ancestor set for any
weak critical ancestor, removing some neighbours can-
not decrease the number of buyers sharing the reward.
Therefore, misreporting neighbours cannot increase the
utility.
• For the winner cw in Group (3):
– If the neighbour set r′cw reported is fixed, the util-
ity of buyer cw is defined by ucw = vcw +
v1
st
N
−cw∪g1stMcw−1cw
−v1stN−cw∪Mcw−1cw
|Mcw−1cw |+1 − v
1st
N−cw
, which is
not related to her reported valuation v′cw . If the allo-
cation is unchanged, no matter what valuation she re-
ports, her utility remains the same. If she reports a
lower valuation to be a weak critical ancestor, her utility
becomes u′cw ≤
v1
st
N
−cw∪g1stMcw−1cw
−v1stN−cw∪Mcw−1cw
|Mcw−1cw |+1 ≤
ucw , since vcw − v1
st
N−cw
≥ 0. If she becomes a
strong critical ancestor of her critical descendants,
her utility will be u′cw = v
1st
N−cw+1∪Mcwcw+1
+
v1
st
N
−cw∪g1stMcw−1cw
−v1stN−cw∪Mcw−1cw
|Mcw−1cw |+1 − v
1st
N−cw
< ucw
since vcw ≥ v1
st
N−cw+1∪Mcwcw+1
.
– If the valuation v′cw reported is fixed and r
′
cw 6= rcw ,
the utility of buyer cw is defined by ucw = vcw +
v1
st
N
−cw∪g1stMcw−1cw
−v1stN−cw∪Mcw−1cw
|Mcw−1cw |+1 − v
1st
N−cw
, which is
not related to her neighbours r′cw . According to the al-
location policy, v′cw = v
1st
N−cw+1∪Mcwcw+1
. Thus the al-
location will not be changed, and no matter what valu-
ation she reports, her utility remains the same.
• For any other buyer i in Group (4):
– If the neighbour set r′i reported is fixed, the utility of
buyer i is zero. If cw is not her strong critical ancestor,
the only way she can gain some benefits is to report a
higher valuation to win the item. However, if she re-
ports v′i > v
1st
N > vi, her payment will be the original
maximum valuation on the network, which is greater
than her truthful valuation. If cw is her strong critical
ancestor, no matter what valuation she reports, the allo-
cation will not be changed.
– If the valuation v′i reported is fixed and r′i 6= ri, remov-
ing some neighbours will not change the allocation.
In summary, we can draw the conclusion that the FDM is
incentive compatible.
Then we prove that our FDM can improve the seller’s rev-
enue compared to the previous work IDM without sacrific-
ing other properties, which encourages the seller to apply
our mechanism.
Theorem 3. The seller’s revenue under fair diffusion mech-
anism is always at least as good as the revenue under IDM,
which is no less than that of traditional VCG among neigh-
bours.
Proof. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), the
seller’s revenue is the sum of the first critical ancestor
c1’s payment and all the rewards redistributed to the
seller, i.e., uFDMs (a, (pi, p)) =
∑
i∈N pi(a, (pi, p)) =∑
cj∈Cˆ−cw (v
1st
N−cj
− v1stN−cj+1∪Mcjcj+1 − Rcj ) +∑
i∈Mcj−1cj (−Ri) + v
1st
N−cw
− Rcw = v1
st
N−c1
+ Rs,
where Rs is the remaining money of the difference which is
not redistributed among the critical ancestors. It is easy to
confirm that Rs ≥ 0.
While under the IDM, the seller’s revenue is de-
fined by uIDMs (a, (pi, p)) = v
1st
N−c1
. Thus, we have
uFDMs (a, (pi, p)) = v
1st
N−c1
+ Rs ≥ v1stN−c1 =
uIDMs (a, (pi, p)) ≥ v2
nd
rs = u
V CG
s (a, (pi, p)).
Therefore, the seller’s revenue in FDM is non-negative
and at least as good as that in IDM, which is also no less
than that in traditional VCG among neighbours.
Since the seller’s revenue is the sum of the first strong
critical ancestor’s payment and the reward redistributed to
her, we can easily observe that the seller’s revenue in IDM
is the lower bound of that in FDM.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an advanced diffusion mechanism
on social networks. The seller can run the mechanism with-
out paid third-party platforms and gain a higher revenue.
Our mechanism guarantees that buyers participated are in-
centivized to offer their truthful valuations for the item and
invite all their neighbours to the sale. All the related critical
buyers on some simple path from the seller to the winner
will be rewarded for their diffusion effort, which is fairer
than other mechanisms proposed in previous work. More-
over, the seller’s revenue in our mechanism is also improved
compared to other related work.
On the basis of our work, many other problems are worth
further investigation. One direction is to generalize FDM to
a more complex setting for multiple items (Zhao et al. 2018).
Since the item can be passed through the critical ancestors
in FDM, it gives us a good chance to study a distributed
method to realize our mechanism. What’s more, the false-
name attack is a difficult problem in mechanism design.
False-name attacks also exist in our network setting. We
find it also worthwhile to consider the Bayesian Nash equi-
librium to maximize the seller’s revenue if given a valua-
tion distribution on social networks (Jain and Walrand 2008;
Hartline et al. 2008). Another valuable future work can
be generalizing our mechanism to broader settings such as
weighted networks to achieve the same goal (Li et al. 2019).
FDM considers to reward all buyers on the simple paths to
reach the winner. What about the others who are not on these
paths, but their valuations play an important role to deter-
mine the payments? Should they also be rewarded?
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